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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops an overlapping generations model with endogenous retirement to examine the 
effect of fertility on long-run pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions. We find that pensions may not 
necessarily increase with the fertility rate. An increase in the fertility rate will raise pensions if the 
output elasticity of capital and the tax rate are sufficiently low, but such a change will reduce pensions 
if the fertility rate is sufficiently high. Our results also indicate that raising the fertility rate is more likely 
to reduce pensions in developing countries than in developed countries, while such a change tends to 
raise pensions for countries in which the costs of raising children are low. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The provision of child allowances has become a popular policy nowadays in many developed countries 
such as Australia, Japan and Sweden. On the one hand, the steady decline in the mortality rate raises the 
burden of social security systems, particularly the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system. On the other 
hand, the decline in the fertility rate leads to fewer workers to support social security systems. With the 
fear that the government may not be able to maintain current social security system, there is a huge 
amount of literature devoted to possible solutions to the problem of the increasing pension burden 
caused by aging populations.  
The literature related to pension crisis essentially follows two major lines of research. The first 
research line focuses on examining the impact of fertility on pensions. For example, van Groezen, 
Leers and Meijdam (2003) study how child allowances affect fertility decision and pensions. It is 
commonly believed that providing child allowances reduces the cost of raising children, and parents 
then have stronger incentives to have more children, inducing more workers to support old people and 
reducing the burden placed upon government budgets. The second research line investigates if 
delaying retirement can mitigate the burden of pensions. The postponement of retirement means that 
workers work longer and benefit from pensions for a shorter length of time. The influences of retirement 
on pensions in a model with exogenous and endogenous retirement time are respectively examined in 
Miyazaki (2014a) and in Miyazaki (2014b). Thus, in prior pension crisis studies there has been a 
tendency to study the effects of fertility and retirement time on pensions separately, thereby 
ignoring the interaction between fertility and retirement. 
The consensus that the fertility rate leads to a positive impact on pensions has been questioned 
by Cigno (2007), who argues that “The combined effect of fewer births, longer lives and sluggish 
retirement age is putting public pension system, all essentially pay-as-you-go, under increasing strain.” 
Recently, Fanti and Gori (2012) analytically examine the effect of fertility on pensions based on an 
overlapping generations model with a PAYG pension system, but they do not take retirement time 
into consideration. Chen (2015) also studies the same issue and considers official pension age in the 
model. These studies all find that pensions do not necessarily increase with the fertility rate. Although 
increasing fertility raises the labor force and generates a positive effect on pensions, it also causes a 
negative effect due to the general equilibrium feedback of the wage rate. 
In this study we endogenize retirement time to examine the influence of fertility on long-run PAYG 
pensions. Since our focus is the influence of fertility on retirement and pensions, we follow Fanti 
and Gori (2012) and Chen (2015) and assume that the fertility rate is exogenous. The endogeneity of 
retirement time allows the change in fertility to affect retirement and this will in turn affect pensions. 
Agents need to work in order to consume and to raise children. Workers are composed of adults and old 
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agents. Adults supply labor inelastically, while old agents can choose how long they want to work; that 
is, they can choose the time to retire. Government implements the PAYG social security system. All 
workers need to pay an income tax to support the pensions. Old agents enjoy pension benefits after they 
retire.  
We find that pensions do not necessarily increase with the fertility rate. Although an increase in 
fertility causes a positive direct effect due to more workers contributing to pensions, it also induces two 
negative effects due to decreases in the elderly’s working time and the equilibrium wage. An increase in 
the fertility rate (tax rate) reduces the elderly’s working time. A higher fertility rate will raise pensions if 
the output elasticity of capital and the tax rate are sufficiently low, but such a change will reduce 
pensions if the fertility rate is sufficiently high. Our results also indicate that raising the fertility rate is 
more likely to reduce pensions in developing countries than in developed countries, while such a change 
tends to raise pensions for countries in which the costs of raising children are low. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 
analyzes the effects of fertility on long-run pension benefits. Section 4 concludes. 
2.  THE MODEL 
We consider an overlapping generations model where agents live for three periods: childhood, 
adulthood (parenthood), and old age. In each period, every agent is endowed with one unit of time. 
Adults with population ( ௧ܰ) spend all their time working to earn wages ݓ௧. When they become old, 
they can choose to work at a fraction of time ݈௧ାଵ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ to earn wages ݓ௧ାଵ. After they retire, 
they receive pensions provided by the government. Agents care about their consumption in 
adulthood (ܿ௧) and in old age (ܿ௧ାଵ) as well as leisure in old age ሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ. The utility function, 
which is identical for all agents, is defined as:  
                                                ݑ௧ ൌ lnܿ௧ ൅ ߚlnܿ௧ାଵ ൅ ߛlnሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ,					                                (1) 
where ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is the discount factor, and ߛ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is the weight of leisure in the utility function. 
Following Fanti and Gori (2012), we assume that the number of children (n) is exogenous. It 
takes a fixed proportion (ݍ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ) of each adult’s wage to raise a child (see, e.g., Wigger 1999; 
Boldrin and Jones 2002; Fanti and Gori 2012). In order to pay for pensions for the elderly, the 
government levies an income tax at the rate ߬ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. The budget constraint for an adult is:     
																																																												ܿ௧ ൅ ݏ௧ ൅ ݊ݍݓ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓ௧,																																																			ሺ2ሻ 
where ݏ௧ represents savings. 
The budget constraint for an old agent is:     
                       ܿ௧ାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵݏ௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߠ݈௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ ௧ܲାଵ,                            (3) 
where ܴ௧ାଵ is the gross rate of return of savings, ௧ܲାଵ is the pensions per unit of time, and ߠ ൐ 0 is 
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the productivity of an old agent.1 
The government runs a balanced budget. Since the tax revenue is used to provide pensions for 
old agents who retire, this implies that: 
                                     ሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ ௧ܰ ௧ܲାଵ ൌ ߬ݓ௧ାଵሺ ௧ܰାଵ ൅ ߠ݈௧ାଵ ௧ܰሻ.                           (4) 
Output is produced by using capital (Kt) and effective labor (ܮ௧ ൌ ௧ܰ ൅ ߠ݈௧ ௧ܰିଵ) and is based 
on the Cobb-Douglas production function ௧ܻ ൌ ܣܭ௧ఈܮ௧ଵିఈ , where ܣ ൐ 0  is the total factor 
productivity, and ߙ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is the output elasticity of capital. We define ݇௧ ൌ ܭ௧/ܮ௧, and then the 
gross rate of the return on capital and the real wage rate are respectively: 
																																																																													ܴ௧ ൌ ߙܣ݇௧ఈିଵ,																																																													ሺ5ሻ	
																																																																										ݓ௧ 	ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻܣ݇௧ఈ.																																																							ሺ6ሻ 
2.1  Equilibrium and steady state 
The optimal decisions of ܿ௧ and ݈௧ାଵ are: 
																												ܿ௧ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻݓ௧
1 ൅ ߚ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߠ݈௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ ௧ܲାଵ
ሺ1 ൅ ߚሻܴ௧ାଵ ,																								ሺ7ሻ 
																														݈௧ାଵ ൌ ߠߚ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ െ ሾߙߛ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺߚ ൅ ߛሻሿ݊
ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൌ ݈.																										ሺ8ሻ 
Equation (8) indicates that working time for the elderly is constant. Note that ݈ ൏ 1. In order to 
guarantee that ݈ ൐ 0, we assume that ߠ ൐ ሾఈఊାఛሺଵିఈሻሺఉାఊሻሿ௡ఉሺଵିఛሻሺଵିఈሻ . From (8), we have: 
																																																										 ݈݀݀݊ ൌ െ
ߙߛ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ
ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൏ 0.																																								ሺ9ሻ 
																																																									݈݀݀߬ ൌ െ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሾߠߚ ൅ ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ݊ሿ
ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൏ 0.																																			ሺ10ሻ 
Equation (9) indicates that an increase in fertility reduces working time in old age. On the one hand, 
the increase in the fertility rate will result, ceteris paribus, in a higher expenditure on raising 
children and lower savings. This will motivate old agents to work longer. On the other hand, the 
increase in the fertility rate means higher pensions due to more workers contributing to pension 
funds, which will cause old agents to retire earlier. As the fertility rate increases, the second effect 
will dominate the first effect and the overall working time for the elderly will decrease. Concerning 
the effect of the tax rate on the elderly’s working time, we find that although an increase in the tax 
rate lowers the motivation to work and reduces the working time for the elderly, the lower after-tax 
income induces the elderly to work longer. Equation (10) shows that an increase in the tax rate 
                                                 
1  Sala-i-Martin (1996) argues that old workers are less productive than young workers due to the depreciation 
of human capital. 
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makes old agents retire earlier. 
Using (2), (4), and (5)-(8), we can derive savings as: 
																															ݏ௧ ൌ 1 െ ߙ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛ ቈሺߚ ൅ ߛሻሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻܣ݇௧
ఈ െ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߠߙ ݇௧ାଵ቉.																		ሺ11ሻ 
Market clearing in the capital market indicates that ሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈௧ାଵሻ݇௧ ൌ ݏ௧. This implies the following 
law of motion of ݇௧: 
																																											݇௧ାଵ ൌ ߙܣ
ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ ݇௧
ఈ.																											ሺ12ሻ 
Equation (12) implies that there exists a unique, globally stable-steady state ݇∗: 
																																												݇∗ ൌ ቈ ߙܣሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ቉
ଵ
ଵିఈ .																									ሺ13ሻ 
To ensure ݇∗ ൐ 0, we assume that ݍ ൏ ଵିఛ௡ , so that ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ ൐ 0. Differentiating (13) with 
respect to the fertility rate yields: 
																							݀݇
∗
݀݊ ൌ െ
ሾߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ݍߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ݇∗
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ ൏ 0.																ሺ14ሻ 
Equation (14) indicates that an increase in the fertility rate reduces savings and the accumulation of 
capital, resulting in a lower ݇∗. 
3.  PENSIONS 
Let ݓ∗ represent the steady-state wage rate; that is,  ݓ∗ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ݇∗ሻఈ. Equation (4) implies that 
the steady-state pensions per efficiency unit of labor can be re-written as: 
																																																																									݌∗ ൌ ߬ݓ
∗ሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ
1 െ ݈ .																																																						ሺ15ሻ 
Substituting (8) and (13) into (15) yields:  
      ݌∗ ൌ ݌∗ሺ݊, ݈ሺ݊ሻ, ݇∗ሺ݊ሻሻ.                                          (16) 
Differentiating (16) with respect to	݊ gives: 
  
* * * * * *
* *
dp p p p w k
dn n n
l
l w k n
     
 
            
 
.                               (17) 
Equation (17) shows that an increase in the fertility rate will cause three effects on pensions: one 
positive direct effect and two negative indirect effects. First, a higher fertility rate means that more 
workers contribute to pensions ݌∗ (direct effect). Second, the higher fertility rate causes old agents 
to retire earlier and reduces pensions (indirect effect). Third, the lower equilibrium wage rate 
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caused by the increasing fertility rate reduces pensions (indirect effect). Depending on the 
magnitude of these effects, the fertility rate may increase or decrease per efficiency unit of pensions.  
Proposition 1.  An increase in the fertility rate will reduce pensions per efficiency unit of labor if 
the fertility rate is sufficiently large. 
Proof:   Substituting (9) and (14) into (17) yields: 
					݀݌
∗
݀݊ ൌ
߬ݓ∗ሾߙሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻߦଵ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻߦଶሿ
ሺ1 െ ݈ሻଶሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ.			ሺ18ሻ 
where  
 ߦଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሼെሺ1 െ ݈ሻߙሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଶߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ݊ሽ,  
and  
 ߦଶ ൌ െሺ1 െ ݈ሻߙݍሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଶሺ1 െ ߬ሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ. 
Define ߯ ൌ ߬ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߙߛ. Using (8) to substitute ݈ in ߦଵ and ߦଶ, we have: 
ߦଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቊെߠ
ሼሾሺ1 െ ߙሻ߬ߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ߯݊ሽߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ
ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ
൅ ߛሺ1 െ ߙሻ݊ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻቋ, 
and 
ߦଶ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቊെߠሼ
ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻ߬ߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ߯݊ሽߙݍሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ
ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻቋ. 
Using the assumption that ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ ൐ 0, we derive: 
ߦଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቊ݊ ቈߛሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ െ ߯ߙ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ
ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ቉
െ ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻ߬ߚ ൅ ߛሿߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ቋ. 
Therefore, if ݊ is sufficiently large, then ߦଵ ൏ 0 and ߦଶ ൏ 0. From (18), we have ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0 if ݊ is 
sufficiently large. 
QED.  
Recall that an increase in fertility generates three effects on ݌∗. When the fertility rate is high, 
an increase in fertility will induce a small positive direct effect on  ݌∗. However, it will cause large 
reductions in the elderly’s working time and wages, resulting in a large decrease in ݌∗. Proposition 
1 demonstrates that if the fertility rate is sufficiently large, then an increase in the fertility rate will 
reduce ݌∗. Because developing countries tend to have higher fertility rates, an increase in them is 
more likely to reduce ݌∗ in these countries than in developed countries. 
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The following proposition concerns how the tax rate affects the influence of the fertility rate 
on pensions. Proposition 2 indicates that the influence of the fertility rate on ݌∗ also depends on the 
tax rate. 
Proposition 2.  An increase in the fertility rate will raise pensions per efficiency unit of labor if 
the output elasticity of capital and the tax rate are sufficiently low. 
Proof:  Since 0 ൏ ݈ ൏ 1, we have: 
ߦଵ ൐ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሼെߙሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଶߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ݊ሽ, 
and 
ߦଶ ൐ െߙݍሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଶሺ1 െ ߬ሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ. 
Using (8) to substitute ݈ in ߦଵ and ߦଶ, we have: 
																			ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻߦଵ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻߦଶ 
൐ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻሼെߙሾߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠݍሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ 
																								൅ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿሽ 
																			ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻሺെ߬ߦଷ ൅ ߦସሻ, 
where 
ߦଷ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ െ ߙଶሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ, 
and 
																ߦସ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ݍ݊ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ 
																									െߙሾߙሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠݍሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ. 
Note that ߦଷ ൐ ߦସ.  
We can re-write ߦସ as: 
ߦସ ൌ ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻሼሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ݍ݊ሻ݊ െ ߙሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿሽ 
					൅ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሼሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ݍ݊ሻ െ ߙݍሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿሽ. 
Thus, ߦସ ൐ 0  if ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ݍ݊ሻ݊ ൐ ߙሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ  and ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ݍ݊ሻ ൐ ߙݍሾ݊ሺߚ ൅
ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ . Define ߙଵ ൌ ఊሺଵି௤௡ሻ௡ఊሺଵି௤௡ሻ௡ା௡ሺఉାఊሻାఏఉ ൏ 1  and ߙଶ ൌ
ఊሺଵି௤௡ሻ
ఊሺଵି௤௡ሻା௤ሾ௡ሺఉାఊሻାఏఉሿ ൏ 1 , and then 
ߦସ ൐ 0 if ߙ is sufficiently small such that ߙ ൏ minሺߙଵ, ߙଶሻ. Since ߦଷ ൐ ߦସ, then ߦଷ ൐ 0 if ߦସ ൐ 0. 
Define ߬௡ ൌ కరకయ ൏ 1. Thus, 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൐ 0 if ߙ ൏ minሺߙଵ, ߙଶሻ and ߬ ൏ ߬௡. 
QED.  
When the output elasticity of capital is low, an increase in the fertility rate causes a small 
 8
reduction in wages, generating a small reduction in pensions. Concerning the effect of the tax rate, 
although a lower tax rate directly decreases contributions to ݌∗, such a change also induces two 
indirect effects on ݌∗. First, it raises ݌∗ due to higher after-tax income and savings. Second, as 
indicated by (10), a lower tax rate makes old agents delay their retirement, leading to an increase in 
݌∗ due to more contributions to pensions. We find that if the output elasticity of capital and the tax 
rate are sufficiently low, then an increase in the fertility rate causes an overall increase in ݌∗. Notice 
that డఛ೙డ௤ ൏ 0. Since a lower ݍ implies a higher threshold ߬௡, then for those countries with low costs 
of raising children, an increase in the fertility rate tends to raise ݌∗. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we examine the effect of the fertility rate on PAYG pensions based on an overlapping 
generations model in which retirement is endogenized. The endogeneity of retirement allows the 
change in this rate to affect retirement, which will in turn affect pensions. An increase in the 
fertility rate affects pensions through three channels: a positive direct effect and two negative 
indirect effects caused by the early retirement of the elderly and the reduction in equilibrium wage 
rates. The results suggest that when concerning the influence of the fertility rate on PAYG pensions, 
we need to take economic variables such as the level of the fertility rate, the output elasticity of 
capital, and the tax rate into consideration. 
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